Mandela and the last Afrikaner leaders : a shift in power relations by Giliomee, Hermann
69
Mandela and the last Afrikaner leaders
Mandela and the last Afrikaner leaders: A shift in power 
relations
Hermann Giliomee
Research Fellow, Department of History
University of Stellenbosch
hgiliome@mweb.co.za
Abstract
The stability of the apartheid system and the Afrikaners’ monopoly of power 
have been the subject of exhaustive scholarly analyses; by contrast, there have 
been few in-depth analyses of the unexpected transfer of power by the National 
Party government between 1989 and 1994.There is a strong tendency to 
present the Afrikaner leadership from Hendrik Verwoerd to PW Botha as being 
so beholden to the apartheid ideology and so intransigent that they missed all 
opportunities to negotiate a more balanced political settlement. Virtually no 
attention has been given to the informal attempts the leadership on both sides 
made to initiate talks about an alternative to white supremacy. The treatment 
of Nelson Mandela in the literature represents almost the complete opposite to 
that of the NP leaders. He has been presented as strongly committed to a non-
racial democracy and a market-oriented economy. A reassessment of Nelson 
Mandela’s career has only just begun.  
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Introduction
During the period of National Party (NP) rule Afrikaner nationalists bluntly 
refused to yield power because they believed that their survival as a nation 
depended on it.1 Some foreign correspondents shared the view that the 
Afrikaners were determined to cling to power indefinitely. One of them was 
Allen Drury, a Pulitzer Prize-winning American novelist and commentator, 
who wrote in the mid-1960s that the white community, which had established 
one of the world’s most sophisticated and viable states, could not understand 
why they were expected to give it up. He added: “They will not do so”.2 This 
1 A succinct articulation of this view in Parliament was given by AI Malan, father of a future Minister for Defence, 
cited in H Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a people (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2003), p. 486.  
2 A Drury, “A very strange society”: A journey to the heart of South Africa (London, Michael Joseph, 1968), p. 451.
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article discusses some of the neglected features of the apartheid era and in 
particular that informal efforts on the part of both NP and ANC leaders to 
avert a violent showdown.  It discusses and offers a new interpretation of why 
the De Klerk government decided to cede power.
Academic perspectives
During the 1960s academics based outside South Africa tended to expect a 
violent revolution. The most prominent scholar propounding this view was 
Pierre van den Berghe. In 1965 he wrote that “the likelihood of revolution 
seems high. Mounting internal strains and external pressures doom white 
supremacy and racial segregation within the near future”.3  RW Johnson’s 
How long will South Africa survive? predicted that while the apartheid regime 
would survive the eighties, at some point later they would have to give in.4   
But whether whites would give up power and under what conditions they 
would do so remained a matter of dispute. In 1971 Heribert Adam argued 
that the regime was a modernising racial oligarchy capable of devising ever 
more sophisticated means to exploit black labour and deflect assaults on 
white power. He did, however, anticipate that the interests would increasingly 
diverge in the white power bloc and that apartheid would be terminated once 
the dominant white classes considered it too expensive.5 Other analysts put 
the emphasis on military pressure coupled with Western sanctions. In his 
1977 analysis of how long South Africa would survive, Johnson expected that 
the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), operating from bases 
in the neighbouring countries, would cause sufficient trouble on both sides 
of the South African border for Western powers to intervene and force the 
abandonment of white rule. Revisiting the theme in 2015, Johnson admitted 
that he had been wrong. MK, he concluded, was essentially “impotent” and 
Western sanctions were always more important.6
Sanctions were part of a general economic crisis, comprising runaway 
government spending on consumption, falling fixed investment, and growing 
external debt. A popular version maintains that the lack of international 
3 P van den Berghe, South Africa: A study in conflict (Middletown, Wesleyan University Press, 1965), p. 262.
4 RW Johnson, How long will South Africa survive? (London, Macmillan, 1977). 
5 H Adam, Modernizing racial domination: South Africa’s political dynamics (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1971), pp. 15-17. 
6 RW Johnson, How long will South Africa survive? The looming crisis (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2015), p. 11.
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investment funds led to “the collapse of white rule”.7 A more sober perspective 
is needed.  The economy was indeed stagnating as a result of sanctions, but 
there was no real fiscal crisis. Derek Keys, managing director of General 
Mining Corporation who went on to serve as the last NP Minister of Finance, 
stated in 2010: “From a financial point of view, South Africa did not have 
to negotiate in 1990, but conditions were tightening … [The] situation was 
serious but it is not as if we had fallen off the precipice. The economy could 
go on”. Barend du Plessis, Keys’s predecessor as finance minister, had made 
the same assessment that a government determined to cling to power could 
carry on for many years.8  
The ANC’s switch in the early 1980s to what was called a “people’s war”, 
combining mass protests, consumer action and strikes with sabotage and 
occasional armed attacks, was much more effective than the strategy of 
guerrilla warfare of the 1960s and 1970s had been.9 But by the end of the 
1980s the government had weathered the storm.  The US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) reported in January 1989 that no fundamental changes were 
imminent. It stated that the government “has weathered more than four years 
of unprecedented domestic and international pressure”. According to the 
report, its aim was to delay fundamental change as long as possible, believing 
the security forces could guarantee continued white prosperity until well 
into the next century. Nelson Mandela was unlikely to be released unless the 
government was certain it could contain any black mobilisation. The report 
added that the ANC leadership realised that majority rule was not around the 
corner.10 
Two important factors have been largely neglected in the scholarly 
assessments. The first is the grave error made by the apartheid planners in the 
early 1950s in expecting the black population to increase to about 20 million 
by the year 2000, and the government’s failure to adjust its policy after the 
error was discovered in the late 1960s.11 During the apartheid period there 
was a fourfold increase of the black population, from just over 8 million to 
7 S Robinson, Review of RW Johnson’s How long will South Africa survive?, Sunday Times (London), 16 August 
2015.
8 H Giliomee, The last Afrikaner leaders: A supreme test of power (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 2012), pp. 316-317.
9 A Jeffery, People’s war: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2009), pp. xxxiii 
–xxxiv.
10 M Plaut, “CIA assessments of South Africa’s transition: How accurate were they?” (available at ever-fasternews.
com, as accessed on 20 November 2011), first posted 22 July 2007.
11 JL Sadie, “The political arithmetic of the South African Population”,  Journal of Racial Affairs, July 1950, p. 
152; JL Sadie, “The political arithmetic of apartheid”, P Hugo (ed.), South African perspectives (Cape Town, Die 
Suid-Afrikaan, 1989), pp. 150-157.
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over 31 million. During this time the white population grew from 2,5 million 
to a mere 4,5 million. The South African case calls to mind Auguste Comte’s 
famous dictum: Demography is destiny. 
Another factor is the resilience and determination of the white leadership 
to hold on to power. Conventional analyses of revolution often highlight 
the defection of a strategic stratum such as the intellectuals, the military or 
the clergy. In the Afrikaners’ case, none of these strata had turned against 
the government.12 The key shift happened at the top of the political power 
structure between June and December 1992 when a small number of people 
in FW De Klerk’s inner circle decided no longer to insist on power-sharing. 
More than thirty years before it happened, the historian Arnold Toynbee 
highlighted this factor in a remarkably prescient essay.
Toynbee’s perspective
In 1959 the journal Optima carried an article by the historian Arnold 
Toynbee.  His  reputation has diminished sharply in recent times, but in the 
first fifteen years after the end of the Second World War Toynbee was among 
the most cited historians in the world. In his twelve-volume work A study 
of history he argued that the critically important factor in the rise and fall of 
26 civilisations in world history had been the success, or failure, of creative 
minorities and perceptive leaders in responding to challenges. 
The article was written against the background of the rapid decolonisation 
of Africa by the European colonial powers that had started two years before. 
He pointed out the contrast between the empires founded by the Spanish and 
the Portuguese on the continent of South America and those built up by the 
British and the Dutch in Africa. The Spanish, for instance, also exploited the 
native peoples, but the division between first-class and second-class citizens 
was less overtly racist in allowing for some people of mixed ancestry to gain 
entry into the elite. 
Barriers to the top were not racial, and hence not impermeable. The result 
was continued Spanish predominance even after independence. So, too, the 
people of European descent (or predominantly European descent) in the 
former Portuguese colony of Brazil continued to play a dominant role in 
12 H Giliomee, “Afrikaner Politics, 1977-1987”, J Brewer, Can South Africa survive? Five minutes to midnight 
(Macmillan, London, 1989), pp.108-135. 
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many sectors.
In stark contrast to this stood the colonies that the Dutch and the British 
had founded in Africa (and one could add the British in North America). 
Political upward mobility for subordinate races was exceptionally difficult 
and intermarriage virtually ruled out. Toynbee pointedly observed that in the 
South Africa of the 1950s there was no easy way of entry into the dominant 
caste for an able and adaptable black person.
Looking ahead to changes in the balance of power, Toynbee stressed that a 
cultural struggle would be more drawn out and more morally complex than 
a clear-cut military struggle. But, he wrote, “the dénouement may be more 
tragic”. Sooner or later, Toynbee stated, ruling minorities had to accept the 
status of “an unprivileged minority” living under a majority they considered 
culturally inferior. The alternative was to hold on to their present supremacy 
by sheer force against a rising tide of revolt. 
Toynbee warned that holding on against the tide was fatal for a minority. 
He warned: “Even if its belief in its own cultural superiority was justified, 
numbers would tell in the long run, considering that culture is contagious, 
and that an ascendancy based on cultural superiority is therefore a wasting 
asset”. He expressed sympathy with the dilemma of minorities: voluntary 
abdication in favour of a majority whom one feels to be one’s inferior “was a 
very hard alternative for human pride to accept”.13
The next sections revisit the apartheid period from the perspective of the 
leaders on both sides of the divide in order to establish how they saw the 
opportunities available to them. One can only gain a proper understanding 
of apartheid and of the nature of the settlement in 1994 by placing the main 
historical actors at a point where different courses still seemed open. 
Looking ahead in 1948
Within the camp of the victorious Afrikaner nationalists there were 
contrasting perspectives on the unexpected NP victory in the 1948 election. 
Eben Dönges, Minister for the Interior who would introduce most of the 
apartheid laws, told a foreign journalist that for him and his colleagues the 
policy of apartheid was there to protect the present and next two generations 
13 A Toynbee, “History’s warning to Africa”, Optima, 9(2), 1959, pp. 55-56.
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against the dangers posed by the growing black and coloured population.14 
By contrast, NP leader DF Malan said after the 1948 election:  “Today South 
Africa belongs to us once more. South Africa is our own for the first time 
since Union, and may God grant that it  always remained our own”.15 By that 
he meant the Afrikaner nationalists’ own.
Among leaders of the African National Congress, the oldest and most 
prestigious black organisation, there were mixed feelings about the 1948 
election result. Albert Luthuli, a future winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, 
said that with blacks little more than spectators of the political game, it was 
irrelevant which white party won. Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, future 
ANC leaders, disagreed. Mandela recounts that Tambo said: “I like this. Now 
we know exactly who our enemies are and where we stand”.16
In 1950 Hendrik Verwoerd, an ex-professor of sociology, became Minister 
of Native Affairs in the NP government and he went on to serve as prime 
minister from 1958 to 1966. He made it his business to tell blacks exactly 
where they stood.
Shortly after becoming a cabinet minister, Verwoerd met with ex-members 
of the Natives Representative Council, who had disbanded the body.  Among 
them were some ANC stalwarts. He ruled out direct representation of blacks in 
Parliament or in the provincial councils, but offered blacks what he called the 
greatest measure of self-government in the urban black townships. Verwoerd 
stated that in order to provide services for the townships, blacks would have 
to be educated and trained to be sufficiently competent in many spheres.17 
This was the only occasion on which such an offer was made, and the 
proposal was in conflict with the NP’s 1948 policy platform. The black leaders 
attending the meeting rejected the proposal, insisting on representation at 
all levels of government. This was a possible turning point at which South 
Africa failed to turn. The black city councils could have been employed in the 
same way that the black trade unions were in the 1980s. The latter used their 
legalised status effectively in ways the government had never anticipated.
14 J Hatch, The dilemma of South Africa (London, Dennis Dobson, 1953), p. 93.
15 J Robertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971), p. x.
16 N Mandela, Long walk to freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Randburg, MacDonald Purnell, 1994), 
p. 105.
17 AN Pelzer (ed.), Verwoerd Speaks (Johannesburg, APB, 1966), pp. 14, 24.
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Verwoerd now embarked on a rigid policy of restricting black political rights 
to the eight black reserves, later depicted in the apartheid ideology as national 
homelands. These reserves in total made up 13 per cent of the land mass of 
South Africa. Until 1990 it remained policy to link even settled urban blacks 
to their respective homelands. It boiled down to restricting political rights for 
the rapidly expanding black population to the fragmented and overcrowded 
reserves.
Nelson Mandela, already an outstanding leader in the early 1950s, helped 
to steer the ANC into an activist but non-violent form of politics. It included 
boycotts, stay-at-homes, passive resistance and protest demonstrations. The 
state finally crushed the movement by charging 157 of the leaders, Mandela 
included, with treason. The trial, which started in 1956, dragged on for five 
years before all the accused were acquitted. 
At the same time the cunning of history was at work. In the courts there was 
no segregation of the accused. The 157 accused were all seated alphabetically 
and had frequent opportunities for talking during breaks. Mandela had long 
been suspicious of some of the white communists, but before the Treason Trial 
he had become friends with Ruth First and Michael Harmel. He nevertheless 
wanted the ANC to remain an exclusively black organisation. Most members 
of the Communist Party were whites before the party was banned. Afterwards 
whites predominated on the executive, but the national chairman was an 
Indian and the secretary general was black. 
During the Treason Trial Mandela mixed with white communists almost 
on a daily basis. He would remain loyal to his communist allies for the rest 
of his career. During the early 1960s he would briefly serve on the central 
committee of the party.18
Appealing to government
From the beginning of his career Mandela admired British political 
institutions, in particular the British Parliament. He saw those institutions 
as the cornerstone of a new political order in a free South Africa. In 1960 
Mandela, on trial for treason, proposed that the black population be allowed 
18 S Ellis, External mission: The ANC in exile (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2012), pp.17-18; I Filatove and A 
Davidson, The hidden thread: Russia and South Africa in the soviet era (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2013), 
pp.300-301.
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to elect 60 representatives in the South African Parliament, which was slightly 
less than a third of the total number of seats at that time. He also suggested 
that the measure could be reviewed after every five years.19
This was the kind of measure Toynbee probably had in mind for whites if 
they wished to prevent a situation in the future where the ruling elite would 
be forced to capitulate without power and without honour. But apart from the 
fact that the white electorate was quite unprepared for it, there was another 
problem. In the dominant white group there was a division between the 
Afrikaners, forming 55 per cent of the electorate, and the English community, 
who was economically and culturally dominant. 
The “winner-takes-all” electoral system, which today is still used in both 
Britain and the United States, is unsuitable for a deeply divided society like 
South Africa. It does not reward moderation but encourages the biggest ethnic 
group to mobilise separately and to become increasingly radical in defending 
its power. 
In South Africa there was not only a sharp division between white and 
black but also between the two white communities. Implementing Mandela’s 
proposal of 60 black parliamentary representatives would almost certainly 
have set up a black-English alliance that would have meant the political death 
knell for the Afrikaners. 
The killing of 70 black South Africans by the police at Sharpeville on 21 
March 1960, followed by black protests in several cities and a capital flight, 
triggered the first serious crisis for white rule.
In April 1960 the government banned the ANC and other organisations and 
imprisoned numerous activists. It called a referendum on a republic in which 
only the whites, forming only one fifth of the population, would participate. 
After a yes vote the government decided to proclaim the republic on 31 May 
1961.
On 20 April 1961 Mandela wrote to Verwoerd on behalf of several black 
organisations, stating that the latter’s government, representing only a 
minority, was not entitled to take such a decision without obtaining the 
express consent of the African people. Blacks feared the proposed republic 
under a government which, in Mandela’s words, was “already notorious the 
19 T Lodge, Mandela: A critical life (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 68-70.
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world over for its obnoxious policies”. The danger existed, he wrote, that the 
government would now “make even more savage attacks on the rights and 
living conditions of the African people”. This situation “could be averted only 
by the calling of a sovereign national convention representative of all South 
Africans, to draw up a new non-racial and democratic Constitution”.
Three weeks after the republic had been proclaimed, Mandela again wrote 
to Verwoerd. He stated that no constitution or form of government could 
be decided without the participation of the black people which formed an 
absolute majority of the population. He demanded a National Convention 
of elected representatives of all adult men and women. The body should have 
sovereign powers to determine, in any way the majority of the representatives 
would decide, a non-racial democratic constitution.20
Verwoerd’s office failed to reply to Mandela’s two letters. When he stood trial 
later, Mandela pressed Verwoerd’s secretary to admit that the failure to reply 
to his letters would be considered “scandalous” in “any civilised country”. The 
secretary replied that the letters had remained unanswered because the tone 
was aggressive and discourteous. Mandela later acknowledged that “there may 
have been something in this”.21 But the demand for the calling of a national 
convention was also problematic from a white point of view. The majority 
would be able to write the constitution. 
In the course of 1960 Mandela, along with some other leading figures in the 
resistance, decided to form an armed body, later called Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK) to wage an armed struggle against the state.  
They had to face the fact that Albert Luthuli, the incumbent ANC president, 
was firmly opposed to the ANC’s embarking on an armed struggle. There was 
a meeting between Mandela and Luthuli to resolve the issue. 
In his published autobiography Mandela acknowledges that the outcome of 
his clash with Luthuli was very messy since the latter retained his commitment 
to non-violence. According to Mandela, Luthuli agreed that “the military body 
should be a separate and independent organ, linked to the ANC and under 
the overall control of the ANC, but fundamentally autonomous”. Mandela 
goes on to state that he enlisted some white Communist Party members. The 
20 N Mandela, “Nelson Mandela to Hendrik Verwoerd” (available at www.nelsonmandela.org., as accessed on 20 
April and 26 June 1961).
21 T Lodge, Mandela: A critical life..., pp. 104-105.
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party had already decided to embark on violence and had executed acts of 
sabotage”.22
The question as to whether it was the ANC or the SACP who made the 
decision to start the armed struggle, and that of Mandela’s role, remained 
dormant until Mandela’s death on 5 December 2013. Then the whole issue 
blew up. The South African Communist Party issued a statement in which 
it declared that Mandela had once been a member of the party’s central 
committee. Around the same time, two important works by professional 
historians appeared. The one was by the late British historian Stephen Ellis, 
holder of the Desmond Tutu chair at the University of Amsterdam.23 The other 
one was by two Russian historians, Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson.24
According to Ellis, the SACP conference that resolved to take up arms took 
place in a posh white suburb.  Of the 25 delegates in attendance, 8 or 9 were 
black Africans.25 Filatova and Davidson write that Mandela was present as a 
member of the SACP’s central committee. They add: “The fact that the armed 
struggle was originally a decision by the SACP, not the ANC, is confirmed by 
documents from the Moscow archives”.
The controversy intensified when the Mandela Foundation released the 627-
page original manuscript of Mandela’s account of his life, which had been 
smuggled out of prison.26 It now appears that some very interesting passages 
were expurgated from the prison manuscript in producing the printed version 
of Mandela’s autobiography A long walk to freedom (1994). 
There is now little doubt that Mandela was indeed a member of the SACP 
executive during the period 1960-62 when MK was formed. During his tour 
through Africa in 1962, just before his imprisonment, he discovered that 
several of the leaders of African states he met rejected communism. When he 
returned to South Africa, Mandela projected himself as a nationalist. Joe Slovo, 
SACP leader, complained: “We sent Nelson off to Africa as a Communist and 
he came back an African nationalist”.27
22 N Mandela, Long walk to freedom..., pp. 260-266.
23 S Ellis, External mission..., pp. 17-18.
24 I Filatova and A Davidson, The hidden thread..., pp. 300-301; I Filatova, “Mandela and the SACP: Time to close 
the debate” (available at www.politicsweb.co.za, 24 June 2015, as accessed on 20 September 2015).
25 S Ellis, External mission..., pp. 16-17; R Malan, “The real story of Nelson Mandela and the Communists”, The 
Spectator blogs, 10 December 2013. 
26 N Mandela, “Manuscript of Nelson Mandela’s autobiography” (available at www.nelsonmandela.org, as accessed 
on 1 May 2015).
27 S Ellis, External mission..., p. 33.
79
Mandela and the last Afrikaner leaders
From the early 1960s to the early 1990s both the ANC and the SACP 
depended heavily on Soviet Union support. In 1965-66 the ANC received 
$560 000 and the SACP $112 000 from this source.28
On Robben Island Mandela never gave an indication of any communist 
leanings. A fellow inmate, Neville Alexander, who frequently debated issues 
with him, was convinced that Mandela did not subscribe to the so-called 
National Democratic Revolution, the key SACP doctrine. This sets out the 
party’s plan to establish a socialist society under ANC rule through a two-
stage revolution. In Alexander’s view, the ANC’s predominantly bourgeois 
leadership had no intention other than serving the interests of the capitalist 
class.29
The unexpurgated prison manuscript was completed and smuggled out of 
prison in the mid-1970s. At that point Mandela had distanced himself from 
some of the SACP members on Robben Island. The differences were partly 
personal, especially with Govan Mbeki, a hard-line Stalinist. But there were 
also differences about strategy, particularly on how to deal with the Bantustans. 
The overall impression one gets from the manuscript is that Mandela was 
no liberal democrat. He endorses dialectical materialism and considers anti-
communism a sickness, contracted from going to missionary schools or 
listening to government propaganda. He argues that force could be used in 
the battle against the government, even if the black majority were against it.
From the early 1960s the state’s security agencies received intelligence that 
the SACP had succeeded in infiltrating the ANC and that Mandela was a 
member of its executive from 1960 to 1962. The question is: How did this 
knowledge affect the treatment of ANC- or SACP-aligned prisoners? Mandela 
himself commented on this in his unexpurgated memoirs:30
In comparison with the wave of detentions since 1963 that in 1960 was 
like a picnic. To the best of my knowledge and belief no individuals were 
then isolated, forced to give information, beaten up, tortured, crippled and 
killed as has been happening since 1963. Speaking comparatively, the security 
police still had a number of men who carried out their duties according to 
the law and who resisted the temptation of abusing their powers. Apart from 
keeping us in confinement, withholding newspapers so as to prevent us from 
28 RW Johnson, The first man, the last nation (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2004), p. 109.
29 N Alexander, An ordinary country (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2002), pp. 46-49.
30 N Mandela, “Manuscript of Nelson Mandela’s autobiography” (available at www.nelsonmandela.org, as accessed 
on 1 May 2015), p. 302.
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knowing what was happening outside, the atmosphere was generally free of 
the brutalities and acute tensions that characterize the subsequent detentions.
Piet Swanepoel, a senior security policeman to whom Mandela refers 
favourably in this context, recently stated that knowledge of the communist 
influence on the ANC triggered a “greater harshness” on the part of the 
security officers in their effort to dispel this influence.31 Torture of detainees 
and deaths in detention became common.
Considering Mandela’s release
The second prime minister during Mandela’s term in prison was John Vorster, 
who served from 1966 to 1978. Like other NP leaders, Vorster believed that 
Mandela was a communist and that the ANC, as well as the SACP, was a 
proxy of the Soviet Union. Initially the Vorster government enjoyed so much 
latitude that little thought was given to substantial reform or to the release of 
Mandela and some of his colleagues from prison. The economy was booming. 
During the 1960s it grew at an average rate of 5,9 per cent per year. 
From the mid-1970s the tide turned against the white regimes in Southern 
Africa.  The economy became bogged down by the sudden jump in oil prices 
together with a slump in commodity prices and growing demands from a 
much more assertive black work force. 
The collapse of the dictatorship of Portugal in 1974 was the start of a rapid 
withdrawal of Portugal from its Southern African colonies. Soviet-aligned 
regimes came to power in Mozambique and Angola. A South African attempt 
to intervene in Angola misfired badly. The Soviet government airlifted some 
30 000 Cuban troops to that country. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
warned Vorster that due to opposition in the American Congress, the Ford 
administration would not be able to counter further Soviet intervention in 
Southern Africa. 
In June 1976 a major uprising erupted in Soweto, near Johannesburg, and 
quickly spread to townships across the country. The political isolation of the 
white community was starkly exposed. The situation was so serious that on 
8 August 1976 the Vorster cabinet had on its agenda the issue of the release 
31 H Giliomee, interview, P Swanepoel, 29 January 2014.
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of Nelson Mandela, who had been in prison for  twelve years by that time.32 
There is no record of the decision.
What would have happened had Mandela indeed been released in 1976? 
Neville Alexander records that in 1971 he and Mandela debated using the 
apartheid channels, flawed as they were.33 Two years before the Soweto 
uprising, in 1974, Mandela had written a secret memorandum, entitled 
“Clear the obstacles and confront the enemy”, that was smuggled out.
In this document Mandela confronted the fact that the government of 
the Transkei, which was the putative homeland of most Xhosa people, had 
opted to take the apartheid-style independence in 1976. In terms of a 1971 
law, Mandela who was born in the Transkei, would lose his South African 
citizenship. 
Undeterred, Mandela wrote in his 1974 memorandum that the ANC faced 
an entirely new development: the independence of the Transkei, which was 
sure to be followed by other Bantustans. Mandela wrote: “The Transkei will 
have an independent legislature, judiciary and executive and may control its 
foreign relations”, and then added:34 
For the first time since conquest the people will run their own affairs. Now 
Africans will be able to be judges, magistrates, attorneys-general, inspectors 
of education, postmasters, army and police officers, and they will occupy 
other top positions in the civil service. Would it not be far better to consider 
independence as an accomplished fact and then call upon the people in these 
so-called free territories to help in the fight for a democratic South Africa?
Mandela would never have recognised the independence of Transkei in the 
way in which the government conceived it. However, if he had proceeded to 
use the structures of an independent Transkei to fight apartheid and promote 
liberation, the existing strains in the ANC might well have become too great 
to contain. A major split might well have occurred in the movement, putting 
South Africa on a quite different course than the one it took between 1976 
and 1990.
32 E-mail: Jamie Miller/H Giliomee, 7 February 2015. Miller’s book on the term of John Vorster will appear 
shortly.
33 N Alexander, An ordinary country..., p. 47.
34 N Mandela, “Nelson Mandela and the Bantustans” (available at www.politicsweb.co.za, as accessed on 14 May 
2012), re-publication of Nelson Mandela, “Clear the obstacles and confront the enemy”, ca 1974.
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PW Botha’s offers to Mandela
In 1978 Vorster resigned. He was succeeded by PW Botha, who had 
transformed the South African military into a formidable military force. 
Botha believed South Africa was facing a so-called “total onslaught”, the 
aim of which was to subvert and ultimately overthrow white rule. In this an 
important role would be played by the ANC, which Botha also considered a 
Soviet proxy. 
Botha firmly believed that Mandela was still a communist.35 He had, however, 
become receptive to the advice of National Intelligence that Mandela had 
become the main icon of the worldwide anti-apartheid struggle and that it 
was counter-productive to keep him in prison. 
In 1985 Botha offered to release Mandela provided he forswore violence 
as a political instrument unconditionally. This was the sixth such offer since 
he was imprisoned. As before, Mandela refused. He did not believe that the 
ANC was capable of overthrowing the state, but he was quite certain that 
eventually the government would be compelled to negotiate for the simple 
reason that blacks formed a growing demographic majority. Like Toynbee had 
predicted 25 years earlier, he thought that the government would only with 
great reluctance embark on negotiations. He resolved to do anything possible 
to prod government on this way.
One way of making it easier for government to negotiate a democracy was to 
reduce the total number of blacks that could vote. By the early 1980s there were 
already 8 million out of approximately 22 million blacks who were considered 
citizens of so-called independent states, and as such deemed by government 
to be disenfranchised. Early in 1986 Mandela told a journalist, Benjamin 
Pogrund, that he was prepared to consider recognising the independence of 
the Bantustans. As Pogrund states, this was “an unusual and significant view 
contrary to that of the ANC in exile”. When Pogrund asked whether he could 
report this view to a cabinet member, Mandela said yes.36 One does not know 
what strategic objective Mandela had in mind when he communicated this 
very controversial view to Pogrund. He always rejected the Bantustan policy 
and would never consider endorsing it in exchange for his freedom. At the 
same time, he was prepared to work with anti-apartheid homeland leaders. 
35 E-mail: N Barnard/H Giliomee, 26 February 2015.
36 Letter: B Pogrund to the editor, Mail & Guardian, 3 February 2015.
83
Mandela and the last Afrikaner leaders
Initially Mandela seemed flexible over a controversial issue like minority 
rights. Like the Bantustan option, it was abhorred by the ANC in exile, which 
would not budge from the first-past-the-post electoral system coupled with 
the rule of the-winner-takes-all. Yet, even after his release Mandela said he was 
flexible over all the fundamental issues, including minority rights.37 
A major uprising
A major uprising broke out in 1984, and the turmoil did not subside until 
the government proclaimed a nation-wide State of Emergency in 1986. 
Thousands were detained without trial. In his ill-fated “Rubicon speech”, 
held on 16 August 1985, Botha rejected the unconditional release of Nelson 
Mandela, who had become the focus of the worldwide campaign against 
apartheid. He made it appear as if Mandela and his comrades had been 
motivated solely by communist convictions in the early 1960s. There was 
no reference to grievances that were widely considered legitimate, and he 
presented no evidence that Mandela was indeed a communist. More than 
anything, this speech and the rejection of the demand for Mandela’s release 
destroyed the government’s credibility as an agent of substantial reform.
President Botha had to accept that the state was no longer able to force 
blacks into the institutions the government had unilaterally created. It had 
become necessary to talk to the leadership of the ANC. The government’s 
secret polls showed that the movement enjoyed the support of at least 60 per 
cent of the population.
Mandela knew from the early 1960s that overthrowing white rule by means 
of insurrection was impossible and that only in negotiations could whites 
be persuaded to cede power and live under a democratic system in which 
their rights were guaranteed. To prepare himself for such negotiations, he 
learnt Afrikaans in prison and studied Afrikaner history. He told his Afrikaner 
interlocutors in prison that he saw distinct similarities between the Afrikaner 
struggle for freedom against overwhelming odds in the very first years of the 
twentieth century and the black struggle for freedom. 
The electorate, however, was far from ready to embark on a radical change. A 
large proportion rejected the conventional form of majority rule on which the 
37 Weekly Mail, 16 February 1990.
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African National Congress (ANC) insisted. A poll conducted in 1988 among 
whites in the Witwatersrand area, the biggest urban conglomeration, listed 
five political preferences for a new constitution. Only 11 per cent of the white 
English-speakers against 3 per cent of the Afrikaners endorsed the option of 
“A single mixed parliament with the majority in control”.38 
In 1988 Botha instructed Niel Barnard, head of the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS), assisted by three other senior civil servants, to discuss the 
possibility of a negotiated settlement with Mandela. Forty-eight such meetings 
took place. Barnard reported back to Botha after each session. 
When Barnard’s team raised the issue of Mandela’s alleged sympathy for 
communism and his refusal to break with the Communist Party, Mandela 
replied that while in his youth he had found aspects of communism attractive, 
he was not a communist. Yet he refused to break with the SACP, the ANC’s 
main ally: “If I desert them now, who have been in the struggle with me all 
these years, what sort of ally would I be to you or to the government?” He 
answered his own question: “[People] would say that Mandela is a man who 
turns the way the wind blows; he is not to be trusted”.39 It was a shrewd 
answer that was difficult to counter.40
The officials also explored other issues. Was the ANC genuinely interested 
in a peaceful settlement? Mandela made it clear that majority rule was non-
negotiable, but added that the new system had to be balanced and that it 
had to ensure white domination would not be replaced by black domination. 
“Minorities have a legitimate interest in security,” he said.41 
Mandela kept pressing for a meeting with the president, and Botha finally 
agreed. Prior to the meeting Mandela wrote to Botha that one of the key 
points in future negotiations would be “the [ANC] demand for majority rule 
in a unitary state and the concern of white South Africa over this demand, as 
well as the insistence on structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean 
the domination of the white minority by blacks”. He continued: “The most 
crucial task which will face the government and the ANC will be to reconcile 
these two positions. Such reconciliation will be achieved only if both parties 
38 H Giliomee & L Schlemmer, From apartheid to nation-building (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1989), 
p. 156.
39 M Louw, interview, P Waldmeir, 29 May 1995, Manuscripts Collection, University of Stellenbosch.
40 For an account of these talks, see N Barnard, Geheime rewolusie: Geheime van `n spioenbaas (Cape Town, 
Tafelberg, 2015), pp. 176-184.
41 N Barnard, “NIS wou sonder middelman na ANC gaan”, Die Burger, 18 February 1992.
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are willing to compromise”.42
On 5 July 1989 the meeting between Botha and Mandela took place in 
the president’s office. Botha had suffered a stroke a few months earlier. By 
all accounts he was no longer the same man as before. By meeting Mandela, 
Botha clearly wanted to signal to his cabinet that he was still in charge. 
In his autobiography Mandela wrote about the meeting with Botha: “He 
completely disarmed me. He was unfailingly courteous, deferential and 
friendly.” When I interviewed Mandela early in 1992, he told me that 
a stranger would not have been able to tell who the prisoner and who the 
president was. “We met as equals”, he recounted.43
Mandela told me, along with several other people, that one of the greatest 
disappointments in his life was having to negotiate with De Klerk rather 
than Botha. After 1994 Mandela  continued to speak highly of Botha while 
frequently criticising De Klerk, sometimes unfairly. The main reason was 
that Mandela and De Klerk were competitors for electoral support and the 
international limelight.
Another reason was the difference in age. Mandela and Botha were of the 
same age while De Klerk was nearly twenty years younger. Having been 
Minister of Defence before he became leader, Botha embodied the military’s 
toughness and discipline. De Klerk, by contrast, could easily be mistaken for 
a professor of law, which he nearly became, or a modern-day bureaucrat.  
We shall never know all that was said at the meeting between Botha and 
Mandela because Barnard gave orders that the tapes of the meeting had to 
be destroyed. Botha was furious when he discovered this, but it was clearly 
the sensible thing to do because Mandela had not been informed that the 
meeting was being taped. Barnard’s account of the meeting, based on his 
notes, showed that the meeting was very cordial and that no substantial issue 
was discussed, except the release of one of Mandela’s fellow prisoners.44
Botha did not discard his original views about the nature of the insurrection 
that Mandela had plotted way back in 1960. Interviewed in 1995, he said 
that Mandela “was led into this affair by the communists and international 
42 H Ebrahim, The soul of a nation: Constitution-making in South Africa (Cape Town, Oxford University Press. 
1998), p. 447.
43 N Mandela, interview, H Giliomee, 1 March 1992.
44 N Barnard, Geheime rewolusie..., pp. 215-220.
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forces”.   He seemed to suggest Mandela was manipulated by these forces. 
He told the interviewer that he had warned Mandela against the dangers of 
international Marxism and communism.45
It would be unwise to describe Botha’s musings as those of an anachronistic 
Cold War warrior. An informed observer like Barnard stated recently: 
“Mandela totally underestimated the influence of the SACP”.46  
Giving up power
In August 1989 the National Party won the general election and De Klerk 
was elected  president. Two months later, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin 
Wall fell. De Klerk later wrote that he immediately considered it a golden 
opportunity to negotiate what he thought would be a balanced settlement 
with the ANC. He calculated that without the substantial Soviet support the 
ANC had enjoyed since the early 1960s, it would find itself off balance for 
a long while and would be compelled to modify significantly its demand for 
majority rule. 
When he first met Mandela in December 1989, De Klerk observed that the 
inclusion of group rights in a new constitution would ease the concern of 
minorities over majority rule. But with Mandela a free man, it was a new ball 
game. Mandela told De Klerk that the ANC had not fought apartheid for 
75 years to accept a disguised form of it.47 Mandela knew that both power-
sharing and group rights were anathema to the ANC in exile, and he would 
not concede group rights easily. 
When De Klerk set out to negotiate, he did not intend to drop his insistence 
on group rights. Robin Renwick, British ambassador to South Africa, who 
often met De Klerk, described the discussions between him and De Klerk in 
the form of a diary. 
In an entry dated 26 October 1989 he stated:48
 As De Klerk was continuing to talk about the need to protect group rights, 
I suggested to Gerrit Viljoen and others that this terminology should be 
45 P Waldmeir, interview, PW Botha, 1 March 1995.
46 E-mail: N Barnard/H Giliomee, 26 February 2015.
47 P Waldmeir, Anatomy of a miracle: The end of apartheid and the birth of a new South Africa (New York, Norton, 
1997), p. 148.
48 R Renwick, Mission to south Africa: Diary of a revolution (Johannesburg,  Jonathan Ball, 2015), p. 107.
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changed to emphasize minority rights. De Klerk told me that he was not in 
the business of “reforming himself out of power”. What he was thinking of at 
this time was power-sharing, not a transfer of power.  
On 11 December 1989 Renwick wrote:49
 Mandela met De Klerk at the Tuynhuis…Mandela said that the National 
Party concept of “group rights” was seen by his people as a way to preserve 
apartheid. De Klerk’s response was: “We shall have to change it then”.
Renwick’s entry for 19 March 1990 reads:50
In the future constitution, he [De Klerk] considered the key to be the 
protection of minority rights… [The] protection of individual rights would 
not of itself protect minorities. He talked about some form of  power-sharing, 
and was, he said, in a hurry in his search for a solution. The ship he had 
launched would never be turned around, but he insisted he was not about to 
commit suicide. 
Protests again flared up and the country was soon in an acute state of 
instability, resulting in a higher death toll than in the 1980s. In assuming the 
dual role of presiding over the transition and leading the National Party in 
the negotiations, De Klerk had put himself in a very difficult position. During 
the 1980s he resented the way in which he and some other ministers had 
been side lined in the discussions about the state’s response to the uprising. 
He told Barnard, chief of the NIS: “I intend to restore civilian government in 
its full glory”. He acted as if it could be done immediately and did away with 
the core parts of the National Security Management System, which President 
Botha had used to restore order. 
De Klerk did not rely on the assessments and advice of the heads of the 
security services and intelligence agencies. Barnard believes that De Klerk 
thought “he had enough political acumen to handle everything personally, 
which was a great error of judgement”. In 2007 General Chris Thirion, 
former Deputy Head of Military Intelligence, wrote in an open letter to De 
Klerk: “If I think of De Klerk, I think of a president who did not trust his 
security forces”.51
Mandela persisted in alleging that government forces were responsible for 
most of the violence, but was rarely in a position to give concrete evidence. 
49 R Renwick, Mission to South Africa..., p. 109.
50 R Renwick, Mission to South Africa..., p. 126.
51 H Giliomee, The last Afrikaner leaders..., p. 368.
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Examining court records, Anthea Jeffery was able to call into question many 
of the allegations made by ANC spokesmen or press reports at the time. 
52  The subject of the extent of the involvement of members of the security 
forces would probably remain a highly contested one for many years to come. 
Nevertheless there is some consensus that the ANC, together with Inkatha, 
a primarily Zulu organisation, were responsible for most of the over 20 000 
deaths that occurred in the violence between 1984 and 1994.
A complex proposal
In September 1991 the NP federal congress accepted a complex proposal of 
power-sharing on different levels as the negotiating position of the party. For a 
national legislature the NP proposed a bicameral system, with the First House 
elected by universal franchise on the basis of proportional representation. 
The Second House would give representation to nine regions, each of which 
would get an equal number of seats to be filled by regional elections. Each 
party that won a specified minimum number of votes in a regional election 
would be given an equal number of seats. The Second House would vote on 
matters affecting regions and minorities. A weighted majority would used in 
the voting in the place of a conventional majority vote. 
On the executive level the NP proposed a presidency consisting of the leaders 
of the three biggest parties and a rotating chairmanship. Decisions, including 
the appointment of the cabinet, would be by consensus. The cabinet would be 
a collegial one, also operating on the basis of consensus. De Klerk described 
these proposals as an indication that power should not be vested solely in the 
hands of a single individual, political party or group – and as a rejection of 
domination of any kind. 
The government called a referendum, which was held on 17 March 1992. 
The voters were only asked to endorse the negotiating process, but NP 
speakers and NP-supporting newspapers insisted that a yes meant support 
for the sharing of power.  Izak de Villiers, editor of Rapport, called for a yes 
vote on the grounds of the “undeniable fact” that the government “insisted 
on power-sharing and would never accept giving up power”.53 In a full-page 
advertisement in Die Burger the day before the referendum, the NP exhorted 
52 A Jeffery, People’s war..., pp. 496-511.
53 I de Villiers, Strooidak en toring (Cape Town, Umuzi, 2009), p. 195.
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voters to vote yes if they rejected the ANC’s demand for majority rule. On 17 
March 1992 two-thirds of the white voters voted yes. 
Colin Eglin, who represented the Democratic Party at the negotiations, later 
observed  that De Klerk was being “very naughty” in claiming he kept to 
undertakings he had given. In the referendum, he said, De Klerk referred 
to the party’s September 1991 proposals “and put them out saying I am not 
asking for a blank cheque, I am asking for this”.54 
Opinion surveys taken in the six months after the referendum made it clear 
that, as the pollster and analyst Lawrence Schlemmer formulated it, “whites 
were essentially voting yes because they feared the consequences of a no vote 
on the economy, but their commitment was to negotiations, and very little 
more”. They “were essentially voting to give [De Klerk] a mandate because of 
the very high trust they have in De Klerk not to sell them out”.55
In May 1992 the ANC walked out of the negotiations and embarked on 
three months of extensive mass action. When Mandela met De Klerk during 
the last week of September 1992, Mandela secured virtually all the ANC’s 
objectives. The two leaders agreed that the final constitution would be drafted 
by a body elected on universal franchise, which the ANC was sure to dominate. 
Apart from the requirement to recognise some basic human rights, there 
were some other minor checks. One was the need to adhere to some vaguely 
phrased constitutional principles; the other was substitution of parliamentary 
sovereignty with constitutional sovereignty.
De Klerk tried to get Mandela to agree to a system of shared decision-making 
in the proposed government of national unity that would serve for five years, 
but the issue remained unresolved until 17 November 1993. In a last-ditch 
effort to reach agreement, De Klerk and Mandela met on the eve of the final 
session of negotiations for an interim government.  Also present were the 
chief negotiators, Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa. 
Mandela insisted on simple majority rule, which meant that a majority 
(50%) would be sufficient to break any logjam. Mac Maharaj alleges that the 
ANC negotiators were prepared as a fall-back to accept a 60% vote should 
De Klerk reject this stance, but Mandela insisted that a simple majority was 
sufficient. He did not know, he said, how he could run a cabinet in any other 
54 O’Malley Archives, interview, Colin Eglin, 3 August 1992.
55 O’Malley Archives, interview, Lawrence Schlemmer, 2 October 1992.
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way. De Klerk accepted this and communicated it to the cabinet the next 
morning as a foregone conclusion.56
Jan Heunis, the government’s chief legal adviser, recalls his shock when he 
learnt that the NP had agreed to majority rule. He knew that its leadership 
had no mandate for this. The mandate, he writes, was for a consensus-seeking 
model with built-in vetoes.57
There was also the matter of the NP’s promise to the white voters. In the 
1989 election the NP leadership had promised that it would seek the voters’ 
endorsement for any deal that deviated radically from the NP’s 1989 election 
platform. The platform promised to bring about an inclusive democracy in 
which “groups” would be recognised as the basic components of the system. 
There would be power-sharing among them with no group dominating 
another, and self-determination for each group in its own affairs.
De Klerk also promised a particular kind of referendum. In March 1990 he 
pledged: “After the completion of the negotiations the constitutional proposals 
would be tested in a constitutional manner among the electorate. And only 
with their support would a constitutional dispensation be introduced.”58 
 Izak de Villiers, Rapport editor, writes in his memoirs that it was assumed 
that a second referendum of white voters would be called to seek their 
endorsement once agreement about a constitution had been reached. He tells 
of his dismay when three weeks after the March 1992 referendum “a senior 
minister” told him: “Izak, we don’t want to have a second referendum”.59
Thus majority rule was introduced without the voters’ approval and without 
the voters knowing the form of the future constitution.  In striking contrast, a 
referendum was held in Northern Ireland in 1998 only after the constitution 
had been negotiated. Whether Mandela would have agreed if De Klerk had 
insisted on such a procedure at the very start of the negotiations is difficult to 
say. It reflects badly on the press that it failed to highlight this aspect of the 
negotiations.
56 P Waldmeir, Anatomy of a miracle..., pp. 231-232. 
57 J Heunis, Die binnekring (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 2007), p. 150. 
58 Die Burger, 31 March 1990.
59 I de Villiers, Strooidak en toring..., p. 200.
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A right-wing challenge
The security forces were baffled by De Klerk’s moves but, steeped in the 
tradition of military subordination to the authority of an elected government, 
they did not resist the political leadership. The major unknown factor was an 
ex-Chief of the Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen, who was convinced 
that the ANC was still pursuing a revolutionary agenda. He believed that De 
Klerk had caved in to their demands. 
Viljoen planned to disrupt the elections, have De Klerk removed as leader 
and restart the negotiations.  Some believed that he could raise 50 000 men 
mainly from the reserve army but also from some Defence Force units. In a 
briefing, General George Meiring, Chief of the Defence Force, warned the 
government and the ANC of the ghastly consequences of Viljoen’s opposing 
the election.60 
To dissuade Viljoen, for whom he said he had “the highest regard”, Meiring 
had several meetings with him. At one of them Viljoen said: “You and I and 
our men can take this country in an afternoon”, to which Meiring replied: 
“Yes, that is so, but what do we do the morning after the coup?” The white-
black demographic balance, the internal and foreign pressures, and all the 
intractable problems would still be there.61 
Although De Klerk and Viljoen shared a conservative political outlook for 
most of their respective careers, they strongly opposed each other during the 
negotiations. De Klerk rejected Viljoen’s demand for a “volkstaat” (ethnic 
state) for the Afrikaners within the boundaries of the state, while Viljoen 
believed De Klerk had sold out. 
It was Mandela who grasped the need to engage Viljoen and to make a 
symbolic concession to him and his right-wing followers. It would take the 
form of an article in the constitution granting self-determination to a cultural 
group. Viljoen formed a party, the Freedom Front, that won close to half a 
million votes in the first election. When Parliament met for the first time in a 
free South Africa, Mandela broke ranks in the procession to greet Viljoen and 
to tell him how glad he was that they had found each other. Recently Viljoen 
told his biographer that he was sad that Mandela did not serve more than one 
60 J van Rooyen, Hard right: The new white power in South Africa (London, IB Tauris, 1994); D Welsh, “Rightwing 
terrorism in South Africa”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 7(1), 1995, pp. 239-264.
61 H Giliomee, interview, G Meiring, 11 November 2002.
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term, and that if he had done so,  the Afrikaners might have been better off 
today.62
Power and regime change
History is in many ways an account and interpretation of power – how 
it is won and lost. Yet a good grasp of the basic qualities of power remains 
elusive.63 Leo Tolstoy remarked in the final chapter of his novel War and peace: 
“The new history is like a deaf man replying to questions which nobody puts 
to him.” The “primary question” Tolstoy went on, is: “What is the power 
that moves the destinies of peoples?” He doubted whether this power, “which 
different historians understand in different ways”, was in fact “so completely 
familiar to everyone”. 
History should be an antidote to the belief that superior political or military 
power determines the outcome of conflicts. In an article that appeared in the 
21 November 2013 issue of the New York Review of Books, Freeman Dyson, 
a renowned physicist, tells the story of a study in the early 1970s about 
how to end the war the United States was fighting in Vietnam. The study 
was commissioned by the RAND Corporation, whose experts considered 
themselves the brains of the US military establishment.
Working separately, two groups, one consisting of two economists and the 
other of several historians, reached completely different conclusions. The 
economists concluded that in a struggle to put down an insurgency what 
matters is not a sympathetic understanding of their struggle, “but rather a 
better understanding of what costs and benefits the individual or the group is 
concerned with and how they are calculated”. To paraphrase: if the costs of an 
uprising become too high for the insurgents, they will back down. As a result, 
the oppressive regime will prevail.64 
The group of historians who worked on the RAND Corporation’s project 
came up with a completely different answer. They looked at numerous cases 
of insurgency and asymmetrical wars, particularly the French colonial wars in 
Algeria and Vietnam, and the British colonial wars in Africa and Malaysia. In 
62 D Cruywagen, Brothers in war and peace: Constand and Braam Viljoen and the birth of a new South Africa (Cape 
Town, Zebra Press, 2014), pp. 224-225.
63 CJ Friedrich, Man and his government (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963) , pp.159-179.
64 M Gladwell, David and Goliath: Underdogs, misfits and the art of battling giants (London, Allen Lane, 2013), pp. 
197-213.
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a six-volume study they concluded that most of the wars lasted five to seven 
years and ended when one side lost the willpower to keep on fighting. This 
was a major insight, but it was lost to the world. To this day, the US Army has 
suppressed the historians’ report.65
By the end of the 1980s the South African government was not desperate to 
start negotiations. It was rather the Fall of the Berlin Wall that provided the 
incentive for De Klerk’s attempting to get an agreement with the ANC while 
its main source of financial support, the Soviet Union, was in retreat. The 
business elite was concerned, but its call for regime change was faint. Soldiers 
and policemen remained loyal and willing to continue to defend the state, 
but among army conscripts considerable unease about defending an unjust 
system had developed by the late 1980s. Nevertheless, in a poll conducted 
in the late 1980s less than a third of English-speaking students and fewer 
than a tenth of Afrikaner students declared themselves prepared to accept a 
prospective ANC government.66 
Chris Heunis, Botha’s Minister for Constitutional Affairs until 1989, offered 
this sober assessment: Sanctions had made it necessary for the government to 
negotiate, but “there was no need to negotiate only about the hand-over of 
power”.67 Niel Barnard, the only person that saw both Botha and Mandela on 
a regular basis in the late eighties, believes that Botha would not have accepted 
majority rule, but would have said to Mandela: “Let’s govern together for 
ten years and let’s see how it goes”. He thinks there was a good chance that 
Mandela would have accepted it.68
There was no sign, however, that the electorate favoured a radical change.
Until the final years of the 1980s De Klerk supported retaining the pillars 
of apartheid. After his election as NP leader early in 1989, he singled out 
morality as his main motivation for ending apartheid and for seeking a 
settlement. In an interview I had with him two months after his momentous 
speech on 2 February, he said that hanging on to power would be immoral.69 
In a television programme, broadcast in 2002, he agreed with Frederik Van 
Zyl Slabbert, ex-leader of the liberal opposition, that he could have been in 
65 F Dyson, “How to be an underdog, and win”, New York Review of Books, 21 November 2013, pp. 22-23.
66 J Gagiano, “Ruling group cohesion”, H Giliomee & J Gagiano, The elusive search for peace: South Africa, 
Northern Ireland and Israel (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 197.
67 H Giliomee, interview, C Heunis, 15 December 2002.
68 H Giliomee, interview, N Barnard, 25 February 2015.
69 H Giliomee, interview, FW de Klerk, 2 May 1990.
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power for at least ten more years. His main problem with that was that it 
would have been “devoid of morality”.70 
PW Botha did not share this view of morality, and it is extremely doubtful 
that a clear majority of the white electorate would have given De Klerk and 
his party a yes vote in the referendum of March 1992 if it had known that 
majority rule would be the outcome of the negotiations.  
Why did the Afrikaner community nonetheless go along with the deal struck 
between the ANC and the government in September 1992? One answer 
would be that after the white referendum the tie between the government 
and its traditional electorate was cut. There was nothing any white group of 
voters could do to stop the process. 
But there may also be a deeper reason. In his doctoral dissertation, completed 
in 1999, the political analyst and pollster Lawrence Schlemmer looked at the 
polls of the preceding thirty years. He concluded that Afrikaners, much more 
than white English-speakers, had begun to stress their religious identification 
in preference to a class or ethnic identification. To be living an upright 
moral life had come to be seen as more important than serving the Afrikaner 
community.71 
The Western world’s moral sanctions, much more than economic sanctions, 
had sapped the Afrikaners’ will to cling to power. Sooner or later, Toynbee 
argued, ruling minorities had no choice but to accept the status of “an 
unprivileged minority” among a majority they once considered culturally 
inferior. 
The Communist Party, which fought both apartheid and capitalism, has been 
one of the greatest beneficiaries of the regime change. The SACP currently 
enjoys more influence in cabinet than they did under President Mbeki, but 
the quality of leadership is far inferior to what it was under Joe Slovo. In 
addition, it has become financially dependent on the trade union federation 
Cosatu. RW Johnson calls the SACP leadership “a predatory elite which rules 
and despoils South Africa”. 72
70 H Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a people (Charlottesville, Virginia University Press, 2003), p. 635.
71 L Schlemmer, “Factors in the persistence or decline of ethnic group mobilisation: A conceptual review and 
case study of cultural group responses among Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa”, doctoral dissertation, 
University of Cape Town, 1999.
72 RW Johnson, How long will South Africa survive?..., pp. 72-73. 
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The Institute of Race Relations, the oldest liberal think tank in South Africa, 
published its finding that 40 per cent of the cabinet are members of the SACP. 
No cabinet member questioned the report. Recently the executive director of 
the institute published a column under the title “So word SA tree vir tree na 
sosialisme gelei” (“How South Africa is being led step by step to socialism”).73
The support for socialism in ANC ranks is not strange.  Black South Africans 
were the last substantial community in the world to receive their freedom, 
the Soviet Union was long the only ANC backer, and communists were the 
only ANC allies in South Africa when the struggle against white supremacy 
entered a new phase in the early 1960s.
At present the ANC government is in a serious bind. An influential economist 
sums up the situation well: “The government is in a cleft between trying to 
pursue market-friendly policies on the one hand and appeasing socialist and 
left-wing elements on the other, who see the private sector as the enemy”.74
Conclusion
For more than fifty years, from his speeches in the dock in the Treason 
Trial (1956-1961), through his letters to Hendrik Verwoerd (1961) to his 
presidency (1994 to 1999), Mandela cast a huge shadow over white politics. 
He never wavered in his conviction that the majority had the right to rule and 
would insist on it if his adversary wavered.  Yet he also knew that white fears 
of black majority rule were great. To break the logjam, Mandela toyed with 
the idea of using the homeland structures to fight the Bantustan policy. This 
certainly would have met with strong opposition from elements of the ANC 
in exile. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the Afrikaner leaders 
were foolish to waste these opportunities, partly because they believed he was 
still a communist. During the all-party negotiations (1991-1993) Mandela 
compromised by dropping the ANC demand for nationalisation, but he 
remained firm on majority rule. 
The NP under De Klerk started the negotiations well, but abandoned 
most of their political demands in September 1992 in the hope of securing 
a stable coalition with the ANC. Some observers argue that the negotiated 
settlement boils down to blacks winning political power and whites retaining 
73 Rapport, 29 March 2015. 
74 A Jammine, quoted in “Business Times”, Sunday Times, 10 May 2015. 
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their property, but, as recent developments show, retaining property in the 
absence of political power will be no easy task. Mandela served only one 
term as president. It is possible that in a second term he could have helped to 
consolidate a liberal democracy by curbing both the communist elements and 
the ultra-nationalists. But he came too late and went too soon.
Samevatting
Na die 1948-verkiesing het NP-leiers verwag dat die party vir `n lang tyd 
die politieke toekoms van Suid-Afrika sou dikteer. Hulle het nooit behoorlik 
besef hoe snelle swart bevolkingsgroei wit heerskappy ondermyn het nie 
en dat daar geen doeltreffende instellings was wat die stadswartes, die mees 
ontwikkelde deel van die swart bevolking, in die stelsel kon inkorporeer 
nie.  So vroeg as 1959 het die historikus Arnold Toynbee daarop gewys 
dat, anders as in die geval van die Spanjaarde en Portugese, die Britte en 
Nederlanders in hul onderskeie kolonies nie in staat was om toegang tot 
die politieke stelsel vir ondernemende swart of gekleurde mense te bied 
nie.  Dit het hulle verhinder om vroegtydig `n kreatiewe politieke respons 
tot die griewe van die onderworpenes te vind voordat dit te laat was. Vroeër 
in sy loopbaan was Nelson Mandela bereid om groot kompromieë aan te 
gaan ten einde  vir swartes ’n mate van seggenskap te verkry. In die loop van 
die jare tagtig het hy egter begin om onverbiddelik op meerderheidsregering 
aan te dring. Alhoewel die NP in die referendum van 1992 beloof het om 
so `n stelsel teen te staan, het FW de Klerk meerderheidsregering aanvaar 
nadat Mandela kategories geweier het om daarvan af te sien. Hy het hierdie 
deurslaggewende besluit op 17 November 1993 aan die kabinet meegedeel. 
So `n magsoordrag is nie uniek nie en kemmerk inderdaad ook die einde van 
koloniale regimes wat deur Brittanje en Nederland tot stand gebring is. Soos 
in die geval van dekolonisasie het die beëindiging van wit heerskappy gespruit 
uit die oortuiging van bepaalde politieke leiers dat hul politieke stelsel moreel 
onverdedigbaar was.
